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Federal Rules Decisions
 
       ! 
Carl Tobias aa
Copyright (c) 1992 Carl Tobias.
*519 Comparatively little controversy attended the semi-annual meeting of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee which was
held in late November, 1991. During that meeting, however, the Committee preliminarily considered the prospect of amending
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions. The Advisory Committee broached the possibility of merging
the three alternative grounds for class certification under existing Rule 23(b) into a list of factors that judges would consider.
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the Committee will ultimately propose that modification, while the Committee examined few
additional specifics. The Supreme Court and Congress have not amended Rule 23 or the two other party joinder provisions,
Rule 19 covering compulsory party joinder and Rule 24(a)(2) pertaining to non-statutory intervention of right since 1966, when
the Court and Congress substantially revised and integrated all three provisions.
Because it now appears that the Committee intends to propose changes in Rule 23, the Committee should also reconsider the
other two party joinder provisions that were simultaneously amended, especially in light of the three Rules' interrelationships
and similar phrasing. For example, all of the party joinder provisions are meant to secure judicial economy through the efficient
packaging of litigation, and intervention is one important procedural possibility that judges should consider when ascertaining
whether joinder is feasible under Rule 19 and when courts find that absentees will not be adequately represented under Rule 23
or Rule 24(a)(2). Correspondingly, each of the Rules expressly requires that judges consider the interests of absentees whose
ability to protect those interests could be impaired if the interests are not adequately represented. This essay suggests that the
Advisory Committee reexamine all three party joinder provisions at the same time and offers recommendations for revising
Rules 19 and 24(a)(2).
*520 Much ink has been spilled over the party joinder amendments of 1966. 1 The revisions were characterized as a
comprehensive package that significantly modified party joinder. 2 Professor Arthur Miller has suggested that there was
substantial agreement on the language of the three Rules as early as 1962, 3 although the Court and the Congress did not formally
adopt the amendments until 1966. This fact is important, because Congress had in 1962 passed few of the approximately forty
substantive statutes, such as civil rights and environmental legislation, later dubbed “social legislation.” 4 It is fair, therefore,
to assume that the Advisory Committee did not draft the party joinder amendments primarily to treat the public law litigation
that these statutes facilitated. 5 The limited provision for public law litigation became important, because Rule 24(a)(2) was to
figure prominently in considerable public law litigation and Rule 19 was to be significant in some of these suits.
A few judges and several commentators subsequently identified certain difficulties that courts have experienced in applying
Rule 19 and Rule 24(a)(2) to public law cases. 6 A small number of judges and writers found that courts encountered some
similar problems when enforcing the Rules in private law litigation. 7 Two commentators, writing soon after the adoption of
the party joinder provisions, suggested that Rule 24(a)(2) had been flawed in the amending process. 8
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*521 Professor Richard Freer has comprehensively analyzed the application of Rule 19 in private litigation and found the
provision deficient. 9 He claimed that Rule 19 is meant to promote efficient “packaging” of all aspects of a dispute into one
lawsuit by identifying absentees whose joinder is needed for a just adjudication and by securing joinder of the non-parties but
that the provision achieves neither objective completely. 10 Professor Freer examined five generic situations in which joinder
was necessary to prevent injury to the non-party, the defendant or the public and showed that the Rule has an insignificant
role in four of the circumstances. 11 In the fifth case, however, he found Rule 19 to be the only technique available but that
the provision undermined its objectives by requiring an independent basis of jurisdiction. 12 Professor Freer suggested that
doctrinal treatment of compulsory party joinder be changed through revision of Rule 19 and statutory reform similar to the
Federal Interpleader Act. 13 The principal purpose of the recommendations would be to permit joinder when the presence of
the non-party would eliminate complete diversity. 14
I have evaluated judicial enforcement of Rule 19 in public law litigation and discovered that numerous courts have recognized a
“public rights exception” to resolve difficult problems of compulsory party joinder. 15 Judges apparently invoked this exception
to facilitate plaintiffs' vindication of important public rights. 16 I found creation of the exception problematic, partly on grounds
of judicial authority, and unnecessary because existing Rule 19 affords courts sufficient flexibility to reach similar results
without straining the language of Rule 19 or judicial credibility. 17 I offered, therefore, suggestions for flexible, practical *522
judicial application of the current Rule and did not recommend amendment. 18 Change in the provision to accommodate public
law cases remains unwarranted today. Nonetheless, if the Advisory Committee deems Rule 19's revision advisable to treat
public law litigation, it should seriously consider prescribing an exception for public law cases. 19
The sharp dichotomization between public and private law litigation employed in analyzing Rule 19 is less necessary in the
case of Rule 24(a)(2). Numerous similar problems created by judicial application of Rule 24(a)(2) arise in both public and
private law litigation. Those generic difficulties, therefore, will be assessed first and the complications peculiar to public law
cases will then be evaluated.
Soon after the Court and Congress adopted all three party joinder amendments, two civil procedure scholars asserted that Rule
24(a)(2) was flawed when revised. 20 Professor John Kennedy found that the drafters had not executed their intent to afford
criteria for decisionmaking, rather than definitional classifications, thereby leaving the amendment unfinished. 21 Professor
David Shapiro effectively agreed with Professor Kennedy while recommending that a number of applicable criteria be adopted
and that intervention of right be merged with permissive intervention, which Rule 24(b) prescribes. 22
Around 1980, Professor Emma Coleman Jordan and Professor Gene Shreve, writing separately, criticized courts for inconsistent
enforcement of Rule 24(a)(2) and for wasting judicial resources in resolving intervention disputes, principally with appeals. 23
Both writers afforded suggestions analogous to those of Professors Kennedy and Shapiro. 24 Professor Jordan expressed concern
that public interest litigants be adequately represented in suits that affect their interests and offered recommendations for more
flexible application of Rule 24(a)(2) to achieve that objective. 25 Professor Shreve evinced greater concern about judicial
economy and provided suggestions, such as trusting intervention of right *523 determinations to first-tier decisionmakers,
aimed primarily at effecting judicial economy. 26
I recently analyzed judicial enforcement of the provision in public law litigation. 27 I found that some courts have applied
Rule 24(a)(2)'s four criteria-interest, impairment, inadequate representation and timeliness-in ways that disadvantage and even
exclude intervention applicants. 28 This has happened, although the Rule's wording affords judges sufficient flexibility to
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resolve intervention controversies properly. Unless more federal courts employ the type of flexible, pragmatic application of
Rule 24(a)(2) advocated by Judge Henry Friendly, 29 amendment of the provision may be advisable.
Should the rule revisors find amendment of Rule 24(a)(2) appropriate to treat public or private law litigation, they ought to
consider several possible approaches. Merger of intervention of right and permissive intervention may be warranted. 30 Whether
or not merger is effected, Rule 24(a)(2) should be modified to conform with certain realities of modern litigation, such as the
need to expedite dispute resolution and to have courts make the best possible substantive determinations. 31 This might lead
the rule revisors to include judicial economy and applicants' potential contributions to issue resolution as important criteria to
be considered in intervention decisionmaking. 32
The Advisory Committee is now contemplating possible revision of Rule 23 governing class actions. If that effort proceeds,
the Committee should seriously consider reexamining Rules 19 and 24(a)(2), the other two party joinder provisions that were
simultaneously changed and integrated with Rule 23 more than a quarter-century ago. This would enable the Committee to
propose an integrated package of amendments responsive to civil litigation in the twenty-first century.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher.
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